Skip to content

Letter to the editor: Avro Arrow

Dear Editor,

As regards the article, "Sky's The Limit", by Peter Muggeride (Zoomer Magazine, May 10, 2010, Volume 26. Number 3).

There were no Arrow prototypes built. The first five Arrows that were produced and flew were built on production tooling, and were Mk I Arrows. These aircraft were powered by the interim American Pratt and Whitney J-75 engine used for the initial flight tests. The newly designed and much more powerful Canadian Orenda PS-13 Iroquois engine was to be the production engine for all Arrows after the Mk I. Eliminating the prototype stage enormously reduced the cost of the Arrow programme.

In January, 1956, the United States Air Force officially notified Orenda that the USAF would only be interested in the Arrow if the Arrow were fitted with the Iroquois engine instead of the J-75 engine that was of lower power. The USAF also indicated it would be interested in the Iroquois engine for use in American aircraft including their B-52 bomber. The U.S. had loaned an Air Force Boeing B-47 bomber to Avro to be used in the Iroquois engine testing, the engine being mounted near the tail section of the B-47.

France also approached Orenda, through the French Air Ministry, for the possible use of the Iroquois engine in the Mirage IV. France was considering the purchase of at least 300 Iroquois engines. On October 31 1958, France concluded the Iroquois programme was cancelled, or was about to be cancelled, and therefore could not risk obtaining the engine for their aircraft. How the French learned this is unknown. The Iroquois engine was just as successful as the Arrow aircraft, and the engine met the same cancellation and destruction fate. Surviving Iroquois engines were made unserviceable at cancellation by deliberate damage.

The cost of the Avro CF-105 Arrow programme was actually decreasing at the time of cancellation, as admitted to by the government responsible for the cancellation of the programme. As outlined in a lengthy letter on January 12, 1959, to the Defence Minister from the Chief of the Air Staff, a reduction cost of $452.5 million to the Arrow programme was a direct result of the substitution of the more expensive Astra/Sparrow fire control and missile system with the less expensive MA-1/Falcon/MB-1 fire control and missile system for the Arrow aircraft. The Royal Canadian Air Force had pushed to have the Sparrow missile for the Arrow while Avro had wanted the Falcon missile used from the very start. This revision to the Arrow programme helped reduce the 1959 to 1960 cost from a peak of $447 million to a peak of $245 million. At an estimated total programme cost of $702 million for 100 operational Arrow aircraft from April 1958, the Arrow programme development cost was on par with the cost of U.S. aircraft programmes, and the Arrow was superior to any other comparable aircraft in the world. With an estimated fully completed cost of $3.5 million each (about $26 million each in 2010 dollars) for approximately 100 Arrows, the Arrow cost was an incredible bargain for Canada!

Had the Arrow aircraft gone into squadron service by September 1960 as expected, it is most certain other countries would have bought the Arrow in the years following thus driving the Arrow cost down even more.

RCAF CF-100 (Avro CF-100 'Canuck') equipped squadrons 410 Cougar, 428 Ghost, and 433 Porcupine were to be completely Mk II Arrow operational squadrons in 1961 (410, 428), and in 1962 (433).

The Ministry of Supply for the United Kingdom was granted permission by the Canadian government in 1958 to evaluate the Arrow programme. Consideration was given to licence production of the Arrow in the UK at an estimated cost of $3.2 to $3.7 million per Arrow. UK interest declined after the UK concluded the Arrow would not be ready for UK production soon enough for the Royal Air Force needs. After cancellation, the UK renewed its interest in the Arrow wanting to obtain completed Mk I Arrows for use as research aircraft for the British Aircraft Corporation TSR-2 programme. The Canadian government refused.

The USAF also indicated interest in the Arrow after its own evaluation of the Arrow programme was granted by the Canadian government. A U.S. proposal in December, 1957, was to have American purchased Arrows stationed in Canada, but as the Arrow programme proceeded, by 1958, as the Arrow was proving itself, the USAF decided to develop the North American F-108 instead; an aircraft that would be cancelled in September 1959.

Defence Minister Pearkes stated on July 8, 1958, Canada could afford the Arrow alone, but not the Arrow, the American Boeing  CIM-10B Bomarc missile, used for the defence of the American Strategic Air Command, and the American Semi Automated Ground Environment (SAGE) system the nuclear armed  Bomarc missile needed to operate. The Arrow did not require the American SAGE to operate as Pearkes inexplicably believed. Incredibly, the outstanding and proven Arrow would be cancelled, and Canada instead acquired the US Bomarc missile, an untried, unproven, ground launched anti-bomber missile that was later shown to be a complete failure for Canada's air defence.

Prime Minister Diefenbaker announced the immediate cancellation of the Arrow and Iroquois programmes in a surprise announcement to the House of Commons on February 20, 1959, one month before his government said it would review the Arrow programme, and on the very day the first Iroquois engine equipped Mk II Arrow, number 206, was scheduled to be completed. This unexpected announcement forced Avro and Orenda to cease all work on the Arrow and Iroquois, and resulted in the immediate termination of employment for approximately 14,000 to 25,000 workers. In the years following the cancellation, many of these former Avro employees found their way into the American and British aerospace industry, working on projects like the British Concorde, using Arrow flight data, and the American Apollo space programme.

Arrow 206 was 98% complete and was being fitted with the Iroquois engines on the day of cancellation. Arrow 206 was anticipated by many to set new world records of speed and altitude on its first flight that was excepted to take place on March 5, 1959. Arrow 206 was to be accepted by the RCAF in March, 1959, and was to be the first RCAF Mk II Arrow.

The Canadian National Research Council desired at least one Arrow example for research purposes after the cancellation, but the NRC lacked the necessary funds to fly and maintain the aircraft.

In early 1960, only one year after the Arrow programme had been cancelled, the Canadian government was confronted with a request from the US through NORAD for supersonic jet interceptor aircraft in Canada to replace the cancelled Arrow. The issue for the Diefenbaker government was that of the protection of Canada, and not one of cost.

In 1961, after political stalling, the Diefenbaker government quietly acquired 66 used and aging McDonnell F-101B Voodoo aircraft, a type that had previously been determined to be inferior to the capabilities of the Arrow and inadequate for Canada's defence requirements, from the United States to replace the cancelled Arrow. The multi-million dollar Arrow programme was deliberately turned into a few hundred thousand dollars worth of scrap metal by the Diefenbaker government.

The five completed Arrows had met and exceeded all the design specifications for the Arrow programme during the mere 70 hrs and 30 minutes of total flight time they had.

The Diefenbaker government never officially gave cost as the reason for cancelling the Arrow, and never made the reason for the cancellation clear.

Thank you.

Trevor Dailey

© Trevor Dailey

Reference Notes

[1] "Until recently, high-performance aircraft were not committed to production until after flight testing of one or more prototypes.... The Arrow programme is unusual in Canada in that even the first flying model has been built on production tooling." - Avro News, October 4, 1957.

[2] "(G) The balance of the [Iroquois] engines and parts are to be mutilated to the extent that they cannot be assembled in the form of an engine .... " - Arrow/Iroquois Termination, Direction A15 0-13, April 7, 1959.

[3] "(d) The result of substituting MA-1/Falcon/MB-1 for Astra/Sparrow together with a close analysis of the programme has resulted in an overall saving of $642.9 million for 37 preproduction and 169 production aircraft or a $452.5 million saving on the programme for 100 operational aircraft.

(e) The programme submitted on 13 August, 1958, for 100 operational aircraft listed a flyaway price of $5.0 million, exclusive of sales tax, for 80 production aircraft. This programme also showed an anticipated recovery of 20 aircraft from the 37 aircraft development programme.

(f) For the revised programme from which 100 operational aircraft will be obtained, the flyaway cost for 92 production aircraft is $3.75 million. The programme included the recovery of 8 operational aircraft from the 20 aircraft development programme.

(g) The rate of annual expenditure for the revised programme reduces the yearly spending for the programme submitted to CDC 8 August, 1958, from a 1959/60 forecast of 383 million and a peak of 447 million to a 1959/60 forecast of 162 million and a peak of 245 million. (h) The revised programme from which 100 operational aircraft will be obtained would cost approximately $702 million from 1 April, 1959"- Air Marshall Hugh Campbell, to Minister Pearkes, January, 12, 1959.

[4] "Arrow costs compare favourably with the some what less sophisticated aircraft in the U.S.A. .... It has been interesting to learn that the RCAF flyaway costs for the CF-100 from production were less than for the comparable F-89 Scorpion. Similarly, quantity production of the F-86 and T-33 was undertaken in Canada at a lower per aircraft cost than from U.S.A production ... [Q]uantity production of an aircraft as complex as the Arrow can be undertaken in Canada at a cost comparable to that for production of a like aircraft in the U.S.A." - RCAF Chief Aeronautical Engineer, Memo., March 28, 1958.

[5] "The Minister [Pearkes] has forwarded to me a copy of a letter he received from Mr. Fred T. Smye of A.V. Roe Canada Limited, which makes a proposal for a fixed cost estimate for the production of 100 CF105 aircraft, at an approximate cost of $3.5 million." - (Charles Foulkes) General, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, 4 November, 1958.

[6] "(c) The adoption of the MA-1/Falcon/MB-1 fire control and weapons to the CF-105 programme has reduced the development time and will permit operational aircraft to be delivered for squadron use by September 1960 in place of the spring of 1961" - Air Marshall Hugh Campbell, to Minister Pearkes, January, 12, 1959.

[7] "If this [Arrow] were the only requirement for our air defence, we could perhaps make provision for it in our succeeding defence budgets; but in order that aircraft of this type and the type to be used by the United States can operate in Canadian airspace we will be required to introduce SAGE in Canada. " - Top-secret brief, Defence Minister Pearkes, July 8, 1958.

[8]"Mr Speaker, with the leave of the House I should like to make a somewhat lengthy statement on the subject of one facet of the national defence of Canada.... The government has carefully examined and reexamined the probable need for the Arrow aircraft and Iroquois engine known as the CF-105.... The conclusion arrived at is that the development of the Arrow aircraft and Iroquois engine should be terminated now." - Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, February 20, 1959 (Black Friday).

[9] "Following the Prime Minister's statement we have received wires from the Government, instructing us to immediately cease all work on the Arrow and Iroquois programmes at Malton and by all suppliers and subcontractors. As a result, notice of termination of employment is being given to all employees of Avro Aircraft and Orenda Engines, pending a full assessment of the impact of the Prime Minister's statement on our aeronautical operations. We profoundly regret this action but we have no alternative since the company received no prior notice of the decision and therefore we were unable to plan any orderly adjustment." - (signed) J.L. Plant for President and General Manager, February 20, 1959.

[10] "Mr. Quarles's answer was cautious in realizing the Canadian dilemma but stated that in general terms they [USAF] would like to have interceptors in Canada in place of those cancelled.... General Twining reiterated that the manned bomber would remain in the threat for a number of years." - Top-secret message from Air Vice Marshall Hendrick to General Foulkes, April 7, 1959.

[11] "If the Committee reported that security demanded the acquisition of these aircraft [F-101 Voodoo], then that would have to be the decision. To purchase them, however, would cause great difficulties. It would place him [Prime Minister Diefenbaker] and the Minister of National Defence in impossible positions. On the other hand, failure to reequip would be bad for the morale of the RCAF. He [Diefenbaker] thought the public had been convinced of the wisdom of the government's decision to cancel the Arrow. To obtain other aircraft now in the face of statements that the threat of the manned bomber was diminishing and that the day of the interceptor would soon be over would be most embarrassing unless a reasonable explanation could be given. Additional Bomarcs in Canada might be an alternative. The committee should first examine carefully what had been said publicly by himself [Diefenbaker] and other Ministers about canceling the Arrow and, in light of that, consider what was possible. In any event, the safety of the nation should be paramount consideration no matter what the consequences. He [Diefenbaker] had been against cancelling the Arrow but had been persuaded otherwise." - Cabinet record, February 6, 1960

[12] U.S. evaluation of the Arrow programme, from October 31 to November 1, 1955.

[13] "The Minister (Through Deputy Minister) Arrow Cancellation - Disposal of material 1 In your approval to my recommendation of 13 March 1959 on courses of action to be taken in respect to disposal of material arising out of the cancellation of the Arrow, you desired to be informed before final action was taken on the method of disposal being considered for the disposition of the airframes and the Iroquois engines. 2 Two methods may be followed:

(a) Declaring as surplus material to Crown Assets Disposal agency. This course is not recommended for the reason that this agency has the prerogative of selling the material in its original state. This course could lead to subsequent embarrassment, that is, air-frame and engine could conceivably be placed on public view or even, in fact, used as a roadside stand. This, I am sure, you will agree is most undesirable.

(b) Relinquishing and DND interest in the air-frames and engines to DDP for ultimate disposal by that agency. In this case DDP can reduce it to scrap. This course is recommended.

I would appreciate being advised whether you concur in the method recommended.

(Hugh Campbell) Air Marshal Chief of the Air Staff CC: Deputy Minister" - March 26, 1959

[14] "One complete cockpit in the configuration established by the RCAF is to be made available to the Institute of Aviation Medicine." - Arrow/Iroquious Termination Direction A15 0-13, April 7, 1959